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Abstract A number of areas of biology raise questions about what is of value in 
the natural environment and how we ought to behave towards it: conservation bi-
ology, environmental science, and ecology, to name a few.  Based on my experi-
ence teaching students from these and similar majors, I argue that the field of en-
vironmental ethics has much to teach these students.  They come to me with pent-
up questions and a feeling that more is needed to fully engage in their subjects, 
and I believe some exposure to environmental ethics can help focus their interests 
and goals.  I identify three primary areas in which environmental ethics can con-
tribute to their education.  The first is an examination of who (or what) should be 
considered to be part of our moral community (i.e., the community to whom we 
owe direct duties).  Is it humans only?  Or does it include all sentient life?  Or all 
life?  Or ecosystems considered holistically?  Often, readings implicitly assume 
one or more of these answers; the goal is to make the student more sensitive to 
these implicit claims and to get them to think about the different reasons that sup-
port them.  The second area, related to the first, is the application of the different 
answers concerning the extent of the ethical community to real environmental is-
sues and problems. Students need to be aware of how the different answers con-
cerning the moral community can imply conflicting answers for how we should 
act in certain cases and to think about ways to move toward conflict resolution. 
The third area in which environmental ethics can contribute is a more conceptual 
one, focusing on central concepts such as biodiversity, sustainability, species, and 
ecosystems.  Exploring and evaluating various meanings of these terms will make 
students more reflective and thoughtful citizens and biologists, sensitive to the im-




Most biologists care about the organisms that they study: the individual organisms 
themselves, the particular species, or the ecosystems in which those organisms 
live.  As professors or teachers, they are excited to share these passions with their 
students, and usually find a ready audience.  Some even hope to share those pas-
sions with the wider public, especially because many species and ecosystems are 
threatened or endangered.  And there are many large-scale human-caused phe-
nomena that threaten organisms and their ecosystems: global climate change, 
habitat loss, water and air pollution, water shortages, invasive species, human 
overpopulation, increased extinction rates, etc.  Many actions are proposed to deal 
with these threats: We should reduce our reliance on fossil fuels by providing new 
transportation and energy options.  We should halt large-scale deforestation.  We 
should assist local peoples so that they can afford to live in harmony with the or-
ganisms around them.  We should improve agricultural methods to reduce impact 
on the environment.  Some even call for widespread vegetarianism, or at least a 
reduction in the amount of meat consumed.   
What is often left out of these discussions – what is often left out of the biology 
classroom – is why we should care about organisms and their ecosystems, and why 
we ought to consider taking these actions to protect them.  Surely it isn’t just be-
cause we find them personally interesting.  We would not be considering, and en-
acting, such sweeping changes if that were all there were to it.  And surely, even 
those who have not chosen to be biologists care about these organisms and ecosys-
tems even if they don’t study them every day.  As much as we sometimes think of 
humans as selfish, concerned only with money or with their own needs, wide-
spread support for environmental organizations, environmental initiatives, and en-
vironmental reserves and public parks, suggests otherwise.  But again, why should 
we care – why should students study these organisms and their ecosystems, and 
why should the general public act to protect them?  Is it only because humans de-
pend on non-human organisms and ecosystems?  Or do the organisms and ecosys-
tems matter ethically themselves? 
The area of philosophy that studies these questions in depth is known as envi-
ronmental ethics.1  Although there are many facets to this field, one of the central 
ones has explored the question of which entities – only humans, all sentient organ-
isms, all life, or ecosystems considered holistically – are deserving of moral con-
sideration.  More importantly, why? What characteristics of organisms and ecosys-
tems contribute to or establish their moral status?  There is an extensive literature 
discussing these questions.  Of course, it is not expected that biology educators 
and their students will become environmental ethicists, although people with simi-
lar backgrounds can and have contributed productively to the field.  Rather, my 
                                                            
1 In some ways, environmental ethics is a subdiscipline of ethics, and in other ways it is a subdis-
cipline of the philosophy of biology, but it might also simply be considered a discipline unto it-
self. 
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suggestion here is that biology educators and students explore the reasons for their 
beliefs as well as the beliefs of others in order to be more thoughtful about their 
own research and why it matters, and to be better able to communicate with others 
who may or may not share their beliefs. 
In fact, there are at least three areas of environmental ethics that biology educa-
tors could profitably incorporate into their classes.  The first is as already men-
tioned: an examination of who (or what) should be considered to be part of our 
moral community (i.e., the community to whom we owe direct duties), and why. 
The second area, related to the first, is the application of the different answers 
concerning the extent of the moral community to real environmental issues and 
problems. Students need to be aware of how the different answers concerning the 
moral community can imply conflicting answers for how we should act in certain 
cases and to think about ways to move toward conflict resolution. The third area in 
which environmental ethics can contribute is a more conceptual one, focusing on 
central concepts such as biodiversity, sustainability, species, and ecosystems.  Ex-
ploring and evaluating various meanings of these terms will make students more 
reflective and thoughtful citizens and biologists, sensitive to the implications that 
different conceptual choices make.  In what follows, I describe each of these areas 
in turn. 
2 The Moral Community 
In this section I canvass various answers to the question of who (or what) ought to 
be considered part of the moral community.  The answers describe various in-
creases to the moral community, beginning with humans only, expanding to in-
clude many nonhuman animals, expanding still further to include all life, and fi-
nally, expanding to include entire ecosystems considered holistically.  As with 
pretty much everything in philosophy, each of these views is subject to debate and 
disagreement.  Thus, in what follows, I describe not only the views themselves 
and the reasons that support them, but also some major objections that have been 
given to those views.  The idea is to give a sense of both strengths and weaknesses 
of each position. 
2.1 Humans only 
Traditionally, the field of ethics considers only humans to be part of the moral 
community; in other words, it is anthropocentric.  It concerns itself with issues 
concerning the behavior of humans towards other humans, considering questions 
such as “is it ever ethical to lie?” or “is there such a thing as just war?”  Although 
a variety of ethical theories (and many variants of these theories) have been pro-
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posed, the two that have had the most influence in environmental ethics are utili-
tarian ethics and Kantian (deontological) ethics.  I will describe each of these 
briefly; the reader should keep in mind that there is far more to each of these ethi-
cal theories (and ethics in general) than I will describe here.2 
According to utilitarian ethics, actions are right (ethically justified) if and only 
if they would produce the greatest balance of happiness over unhappiness, taking 
into consideration all who would affected by the proposed action3. In one formula-
tion, “happiness” is construed in terms of physical pleasure and “unhappiness” is 
construed in terms of physical pain; other formulations consider “higher” pleas-
ures or other forms of happiness and well-being.  In weighing the balance of po-
tential happiness against that of potential unhappiness, all who have the capacity 
for these experiences and who would be affected by the proposed actions are con-
sidered equally (e.g., no favoritism is given for those who are of the same religion 
or nationality), although greater pains “weigh” more than lesser ones and greater 
happiness “weighs” more than lesser happiness.  Furthermore, on the utilitarian 
view, the consequences of a proposed action are the only factor that goes into the 
determination of whether an action is right; other considerations about the type of 
action (e.g., whether lying is involved) are not relevant.  Of course, if the action 
has not occurred yet, it can be difficult to know with any degree of certainty what 
the consequences of an action will be; the utilitarian thus makes the analysis given 
the best available information of likely consequences and their severity.  If there is 
another action that produces a greater balance of happiness over unhappiness, then 
that is the right action, according to the utilitarian. 
The basic intuition behind utilitarianism is that, all things being equal, happi-
ness is a good thing (and thus, it is good to bring more of it into the world) and 
unhappiness is a bad thing (and thus, it is good to try to reduce the amount of it in 
the world).  There does not seem to be any principled way to say that one person’s 
pain matters more than the equivalent pain experienced by another person, so all 
equivalent pains count equally.4  Pain is pain.  (As we will see below, consistency 
of reasoning is an important criterion in environmental ethics, and in ethics more 
generally). Furthermore, it seems as though the ability to feel pleasure and pain 
are morally relevant characteristics.  If I stomp on a pen (which, of course, lacks 
the ability to feel pleasure and pain), I have not wronged the pen in the same way 
that I would wrong a person if I stomped on her foot.  Even if I destroy the pen, I 
have not wronged it; at best, I have wronged other humans who might have made 
use of it, but that is a different matter. 
In spite of its intuitive appeal, utilitarianism has been subject to a number of 
well-known objections.  For one, it seems to countenance the production of good 
                                                            
2 For an accessible introduction to ethics, see Rachels and Rachels (2011) or Hinman (2012). 
3 Here I describe what has come to be known as “act utilitarianism.”  I will leave off discussion 
of other forms of utilitarianism, such as “rule utilitarianism.” 
4 Here I consider only the ethical weight of pain itself and not any other possible downstream 
consequences of that pain. 
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consequences for the many at the expense of the few, as occurred with the infa-
mous experimentation on Jews by the Nazis, the Tuskegee syphilis experiment on 
African Americans, etc (see Plutynski this volume).  For another, even if one does 
have reasonable information about future consequences, it is difficult to know how 
to weigh them against one another, and different people can provide different rea-
sonable weighings.  Both of these objections (and others not mentioned) have 
been responded to in the literature, but other philosophers think that a Kantian ap-
proach to ethics, which lacks these problems, is superior. 
Rather than take as its starting point the ability to feel pain and pleasure, a 
Kantian approach to ethics points out that beings such as humans that are rational 
and autonomous (i.e., can think, have a will of their own, and can make decisions 
and reason about them) are importantly different from things.  Mere things (such 
as my pen) do not have a will to violate; there is thus nothing wrong in using them 
for whatever purposes we wish.  However, Kant argues, we ought not to use ra-
tional and autonomous beings, with wills of their own, as mere things, as mere 
means to our ends. On a Kantian view, then, rationality and autonomy are morally 
relevant characteristics (seemingly a higher “bar” than the ability to feel pain and 
pleasure).  Thus, Kant states that we ought to: “Act in such a way that you treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always at the same 
time as an end and never merely as a means” (Kant 1785: 43)5. Kant does believe 
that we ought not to cause undue suffering to other animals, but this is because he 
believes that such actions would harm our abilities to act ethically towards other 
humans and not because of consideration towards the non-human animals them-
selves.  Again, beings that are not rational and autonomous are mere things (and 
Kant included non-human animals in this category). 
Perhaps foremost among the objections to Kantian ethics is its uncompromising 
nature.  Always treating other humans as an end and never merely as a means has 
a consequence that we should never lie (or violate the autonomy of other people in 
any way), regardless of circumstances.  Few could live up to this, and even if we 
could – or could aspire to – it is not clear whether we should. 
Setting aside the particular concerns with utilitarian ethics and Kantian ethics, 
some environmental ethicists challenge the implication that the moral community 
consists of humans only. After all, the members of many other species besides 
humans have the ability to feel pleasure and pain; on what grounds are they ex-
cluded from the moral community? Traditional (anthropocentric) utilitarians usu-
ally defend this by invoking other morally relevant criteria, such as the greater ra-
tionality of humans or their ability to engage in moral deliberations6. However, 
                                                            
5 This is known as the Categorical Imperative; there are other formulations, but again, I focus on 
the one that is most relevant for environmental ethics. 
6 Or by making claims that humans feel greater pain and pleasure than other species – but those 
claims are difficult to substantiate, and do not seem to be true in all cases.  It would be hard to 
show, for example, that one’s pleasure in eating chicken outweighs the suffering of a chicken in 
a factory farm. 
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once one uses criteria such as greater rationality, greater autonomy, or ability to 
participate in moral deliberations, one has gone beyond the capacity of some hu-
mans, namely, those who are very young or those who suffer from a mental handi-
cap or disorder.  Indeed, it seems that the mental capacities of some non-human 
animals exceed those of some humans.  This puts defenders of the human-only 
moral community in an uncomfortable position: they must 1) acknowledge that 
some humans do not fit their criteria and are thus not in the moral community and 
not deserving of direct moral consideration; 2) find some morally relevant charac-
teristic that all humans have and all non-human animals lack (if one merely cites 
“being human,” then one is merely showing a biased preference for one’s species, 
i.e., being a “speciesist”); or 3) acknowledge that their account is based on a rank 
and indefensible inconsistency. 
2.2 Animals 
The inconsistency problem that plagues traditional anthropocentric ethics is often 
cited as a reason for recognizing that many (although perhaps not all – more on 
this in a moment) nonhuman animals ought to be considered as part of the moral 
community.  The two most well-known proponents of this family of views are Pe-
ter Singer and Tom Regan; their views can be characterized as extensions to tradi-
tional utilitarianism and Kantian ethics, respectively.  We will examine each of 
their views in turn.   
Singer’s animal-centered utilitarianism was in fact predicted by the founder of 
utilitarian ethics, Jeremy Bentham; in an oft-quoted passage, Bentham states: 
It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the 
skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a 
sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it 
the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog 
is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an 
infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, 
what would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can 
they suffer? (Bentham 1823: Chapter xvii, n. p.122; emphasis in original). 
Singer, following Bentham’s line of reasoning, argues that the ability to suffer is 
that which confers moral standing and that “the fact that [a being that suffers] is 
not a member of our own species cannot be a moral reason for failing to take its 
suffering into account” (Singer 1979 p.194). To think otherwise, Singer asserts, 
would be “arbitrary” and “morally indefensible,” analogous to the way that white 
slave owners who denied moral consideration to blacks were being arbitrary; the 
logic of racism and “speciesism” are the same (Singer 1979, p.194).  Singer clari-
fies that he does not think that all species are equal; some are more intelligent than 
others, some are stronger or better able to communicate, etc.  However, he main-
tains that not all humans are equal on these grounds, either – and we would cer-
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tainly not suggest that more intelligent humans be granted greater moral consider-
ation than those who are less intelligent.  Rather, the principle  we accept, Singer 
claims (and ought to accept), is the principle of equal consideration of interests.  
On this view, equal interests count equally, regardless of the skin color of the hu-
man or the species of the animal.  According to Singer, “the capacity for suffering 
and enjoyment is […] sufficient for us to say that a being has interests–at an abso-
lute minimum, an interest in not suffering”; this capacity, on Singer’s view “is a 
prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we 
can speak of interests in a meaningful way” (Singer 2001, pp.7-8; emphasis in 
original). A rock, Singer asserts, is not sentient7 and thus has no interests.  Singer 
acknowledges that whereas some animal species (such as species of mammals and 
birds) are almost certainly sentient and many probably are (vertebrates), assertions 
that others are sentient are more dubious (insects, crustaceans, mollusks) or highly 
improbable (plants); such differences ought to be kept in mind when weighing po-
tential interests (Singer 1979).  For example, on Singer’s account, the likely inter-
ests of a bird would outweigh the dubious interests of an insect. Finally, note that 
the principle of equal consideration of interests does not – by any means – dictate 
that the interests of nonhuman sentient animals outweigh those of humans!  Ra-
ther, Singer claims only that the interests of all sentient beings who stand to be af-
fected by a proposed action must be taken into consideration. And being taken into 
consideration means only that; it does not imply that all who are taken into con-
sideration should ultimately be treated equally, since conclusions about treatment 
depend on the particulars of the case at hand (namely, the amounts of pain and 
pleasure that would be experienced by those who stand to be affected by the pro-
posed action). 
Singer suggests that his animal-centered utilitarianism would have numerous 
consequences for our dealings with our environment.  Whereas an anthropocentric 
utilitarian might choose a less expensive yet more painful form of pest control, a 
Singer utilitarian would choose a less painful method (e.g., birth control for squir-
rels) even if it were more expensive.  An anthropocentric utilitarian might be in 
favor of clearcutting a forest, whereas an animal-centered one would favor a more 
selective cutting (because of the negative impacts that clearcutting – a drastic 
change in habitat – has on sentient species).  And we might change the siting of 
human facilities (e.g., new power plants) to locations where they have less impact 
on other sentient species.  However, Singer asserts, all else being equal, killing an 
endangered sentient animal is morally equivalent to killing a non-endangered one; 
the scales would tip in favor of the endangered species only if there were addition-
al negative effects on other sentient species (including humans).8 
                                                            
7 I will use the term “sentience” (or “sentient”) to refer to the capacity for suffering and enjoy-
ment, although the reader should be aware that different authors use this term differently.    
8 The application of Singer’s views and the other ethical views described in this section to vari-
ous environmental challenges will be discussed in further detail in Section 3 below. 
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Regan shares Singer’s concerns about the inconsistency problems with tradi-
tional anthropocentric ethics.  However, he rejects Singer’s animal-centric utilitar-
ianism on the grounds that utilitarianism (regardless of whose interests are includ-
ed) is inadequate as a moral theory, in part because it countenances the production 
of good consequences for the many at the expense of the few, as mentioned above.  
One way to block this unpalatable implication, Regan claims, is by recognizing 
that it is not individuals’ pains and pleasures that matter ethically, but rather, the 
individuals themselves.  That is, he suggests that we ought to recognize that indi-
viduals have inherent value; furthermore, in order to avoid sexism, racism, dis-
crimination on the basis of intelligence, etc., we need to recognize that all who 
have inherent value have it equally.  Thus, all individuals with inherent value 
“have an equal right to be treated with respect, to be treated in ways that do not 
reduce them to the status of things, as if they existed as resources for others” (Re-
gan 1985: 21).  From this quotation, we can see the influence of Kantian ethics on 
Regan’s thinking.  However, unlike Kant, Regan assumes that all human beings 
have inherent value, regardless of their capacity; note that not all who are human 
are rational and autonomous and not all are capable of reasoning morally (e.g., in-
fants and the mentally handicapped).  Again, though, once you make that assump-
tion, you must (in order to be consistent) recognize that all beings who share the 
same capacities as human beings also have inherent value; he states, “…the basic 
similarity is simply this: we are each of us the experiencing subject of a life, a 
conscious creature having an individual welfare that has importance to us whatev-
er our usefulness to others” (Regan 1985 p. 22). This would seem to be a slightly 
more demanding criterion for inclusion in the moral community than that offered 
by Singer.  However, Regan leaves open the question of whether entities that are 
not “experiencing subjects of a life” have inherent value as well, saying that “we 
do not need to know how many individuals have inherent value before we can 
know that some do” (Regan 1985 p.23). 
With regard to environmental issues, Regan would be opposed to any practice 
that treated experiencing subjects of a life as mere resources; each has a “funda-
mental right to be treated with respect.”  When it comes to animals in the wild, 
Regan urges us to “let them be!” (Regan 1983 p.361; emphasis in original).This 
would imply, for example, halting the destruction of their natural habitat and in-
creasing surveillance on poaching activities, with stiffer fines and longer prison 
sentences (Regan 1983).  As for members of endangered species, Regan thinks we 
ought to protect them, but only for the same reason that members of non-
endangered species should be protected; members of endangered species should 
not receive special protection, on Regan’s view (Regan 1983). 
Some students may wonder if, by including non-human animals in the moral 
community, we are committed to saying predators act unethically when they kill 
other animals.  This worry is understandable, but it encompasses a few misunder-
standings.  For one thing, most instances of predators killing other animals are re-
quired for the predators to sustain themselves; big cats, for example, arguably 
cannot survive on a vegetarian diet.  And while there may be circumstances in 
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which humans must kill other animals to survive, many of us are not currently in 
that situation.  Many humans commit themselves to eating vegetarian or vegan di-
ets and to avoid animal-derived products, products tested on animals, etc., so hu-
man survival (for many of us) does not seem to require the killing of other ani-
mals.  If it did, that would likely change the ethical analysis of such killings.  
Perhaps more importantly, the worry about predators acting unethically confuses 
moral agents with moral patients.  When it is recognized that an entity ought to be 
included in the moral community, it is as a moral patient, i.e., a being that is owed 
moral consideration or has moral rights.  However, being a moral patient does not 
mean that one is a moral agent, i.e., a being that is held responsible for its actions.  
Consider, for example, human infants.  They are uncontroversially members of the 
moral community, and yet they are moral patients without being moral agents; if a 
baby were to pick up a loaded gun left on the floor and shoot her sibling, we 
would not hold the baby morally responsible because she lacks the capacity (such 
as the ability to reason morally and to act on her reasonings) to be a moral agent.  
The worry about predators assumes that the criteria for inclusion in the moral 
community (i.e., for being a moral patient) are the same as the criteria for being 
held morally responsible for one’s actions (i.e., for being moral agent), but the 
scenario of baby who accidently shoots her sibling shows that those two sets of 
criteria are arguably not the same.  In the same way, non-human animals who lack 
the capacity for moral reasoning are not moral agents even if they are held to be 
moral patients. 
Singer’s and Regan’s inclusion of (some) animals in the moral community is 
not without criticism.  Mary Anne Warren (1983) argues that we must be more 
nuanced in our claims about which rights ought to be granted to which species, 
and that such rights must be based on the particular capacities of that species.  For 
example, Warren suggests that members of species that seem to need and value 
freedom (humans, whales, migratory birds) have a greater right to liberty than 
members of species who do not.  On a different tack, Gary Varner (2002) points 
out that humans can have biologically-based needs that make certain things in our 
best interests (such as getting enough ascorbic acid to avoid scurvy) even if we do 
not, or could not be expected to, consciously desire them.  However, if biological-
ly-based needs can give rise to interests, then it looks arbitrary to include only sen-
tient beings (or only “experiencing subjects of a life”) in our moral community, 
since plants (for example) have biologically based needs as well.   Indeed, as Paul 
Taylor (1981) suggests, perhaps the criteria that we usually choose for determin-
ing entrance into the moral community (such as consciousness) are simply based 
on characteristics that are valuable for us, and are thus prejudiced and self-serving; 
for a plant, the ability to photosynthesize is far more valuable than consciousness.  
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2.3 All life 
Recall Singer’s view that a being that lacks the capacity to experience suffering or 
enjoyment lacks interests.  In his words, “If a being is not capable of suffering, or 
of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account” 
(Singer 2001 p. 8)  Such a claim practically challenges other philosophers to iden-
tify other characteristics that might be taken into account in determining which en-
tities are part of the moral community, such as Varner’s aforementioned criterion 
of “biologically-based needs” – a criterion that applies to all living beings, not just 
animals. More specifically, Taylor (1981) maintains that every organism has a 
good of its own which can be benefitted or harmed by our actions.  Actions that 
preserve life and well-being, that keep an organism strong and healthy, are good 
for the organism, whereas actions that are detrimental to the life and well-being of 
an organism are bad for it.  In other words, actions can be for or against the inter-
ests of an organism, where having “interests” does not require the entity to be con-
scious of those interests (or conscious at all).  Views such as Varner’s and Tay-
lor’s that include all living beings in the moral community have come to be known 
as biocentric. 
Let’s focus on Taylor’s biocentric views in particular.  Unlike Singer and Re-
gan, Taylor does not choose a utilitarian or Kantian ethical orientation, but instead 
tries to incorporate aspects of both in his thinking.  On Taylor’s account, we adopt 
the moral attitude of respect for nature when we recognize that wild living things 
have inherent worth; inherent worth involves two general principles, and it is here 
that we can see both the utilitarian and Kantian influences, respectively.  Accord-
ing to the first principle, the principle of moral consideration, every wild living be-
ing is a member of the Earth’s community of life and is for that reason deserving 
of moral consideration–its good must be taken into account whenever it might be 
affected by our actions–although its good may need to be overridden to fulfill 
some other good.  According to the second principle, the principle of intrinsic val-
ue, the realization of the good of any wild living being is something that is intrin-
sically valuable, meaning that “…its good is prima facie worthy of being pre-
served or promoted as an end in itself and for the sake of the entity whose good it 
is” (Taylor 1981, p.201).  Thus, “it must never be treated as if it were a mere ob-
ject or thing whose entire value lies in being instrumental to the good of some oth-
er entity”  (Taylor 1981, p.201). In sum, to say that a wild living thing has inherent 
worth “is to say that its good is deserving of the concern and consideration of all 
moral agents, and that the realization of its good has intrinsic value, to be pursued 
as an end in itself and for the sake of the entity whose good it is” (Taylor 1981 
p.201). 
The implications of biocentrism for environmental ethics are relatively clear.  
In deciding which actions to take, we must broaden the scope of the entities whose 
potential well-being or harm must be taken into account to include all living be-
ings, whether sentient or not.  If someone proposes building a movie theatre com-
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plex on the site where a species of endangered butterfly lives, the welfare of the 
butterfly must be factored into the decision.  Or, if we find out that the production 
of ozone due to emissions from our automobiles is harming sequoias and other 
trees, we must consider whether we ought to change our transportation practices. 
What is less clear is how we are to act in full accordance with a biocentric eth-
ic: how to make such difficult decisions and whether it is possible to live in ac-
cordance with them.  If we endorse Regan’s animal-centered Kantianism, we can 
give up eating animals, give up animal experimentation, give up hunting and de-
struction of habitat (although all of this might demand quite a bit of effort on our 
part), but unfortunately our species cannot give up killing plants and continue to 
survive.  All biocentrists acknowledge this, and all have developed ways of trying 
to balance competing interests (e.g., Taylor 1986, Varner 2002) but the challenge 
is to do so without continually defaulting to the interests of humans9 or by devel-
oping an ethic that humans are unable to live by.  It is not clear that such a chal-
lenge can be met. 
2.4 Ecosystems 
All of the views discussed so far have focused on individuals, whether individual 
humans, individual sentient organisms, or individual living organisms.  Perhaps 
that is why we encounter difficulties in sorting through ethical conflicts, especially 
for biocentrism.  Would a holistic approach be preferable? 
Aldo Leopold, who is usually understood to have a holistic approach, argues 
that ethics “has its origin in the tendency of interdependent individuals or groups 
to evolve modes of co-operation” (Leopold 1949 p.201).  Leopold hypothesizes 
that humanity’s first ethics, where an ethic is “a limitation on freedom of action” 
or “a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct,” dealt with relations be-
tween individual humans and later extended to relations between individuals and 
society.  We accept restrictions on our actions within our society and co-operate 
with the fellow members of our society with whom we are interdependent.  He 
then suggests that it is time that our ethics should be extended to the land, by 
which he means the community of “soils, waters, plants, and animals” (Leopold 
1949: 204) with which we are also interdependent.  That humans are interdepend-
ent with the land can be seen by looking at key points in history, which were actu-
ally the product of biotic interactions between people and land.  For example, he 
contrasts the impact of grazing and plowing in Kentucky and the Southwest U.S.; 
the former led to useful bluegrass whereas the latter led to the Dust Bowl, “a pro-
gressive and mutual deterioration, not only of plants and soils, but of the animal 
community subsisting thereon” (Leopold 1949 p.206). That humans are interde-
                                                            
9 Or, at least the most important interests of humans.  Of course, determining what those are is a 
non-trivial matter and is bound to be controversial. 
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pendent with the land can also be seen through an examination of what Leopold 
calls “the land pyramid”: 
Plants absorb energy from the sun. This energy flows through a circuit called the biota, 
which may be represented by a pyramid consisting of layers. The bottom layer is the soil. 
A plant layer rests on the soil, an insect layer on the plants, a bird and rodent layer on the 
insects, and so on up through various animal groups to the apex layer, which consists of 
the larger carnivores (Leopold 1949 p.215). 
This energy flow is called a pyramid because the bottom layers are much more 
abundant than the top layers; prey tend to reproduce at a faster rate and to have 
more biomass overall than their predators.  And humans, Leopold asserts, are at an 
intermediate layer with other omnivores.  The land pyramid also captures lines of 
dependency (or “food chains”), such as “soil-corn-cow-farmer.”  As all organisms 
are part of many such lines of dependency, the pyramid is an illustration of the in-
terdependence of the biotic community, a community whose “functioning depends 
on the co-operation and competition of its diverse parts” (Leopold 1949 p.215). 
Again, Leopold is suggesting that once we understand our interdependence 
with the land, we ought to extend our ethics to encompass it.  The following two 
oft-quoted passages sum up Leopold’sland ethic: 
In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-
community to plain member and citizen of it.  It implies respect for his fellow-members, 
and also respect for the community as such (Leopold 1949 p.204). 
 
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community.  It is wrong when it tends otherwise (Leopold 1949 pp.224-225). 
These quotations – especially the second quotation – have been understood as 
claiming that the primary ethical value adheres to ecosystems, considered holisti-
cally, rather than the individuals that compose ecosystems; this view has come to 
be known as ecocentrism (J. Baird Callicott 1987 is probably the philosopher who 
has been most influential in defending this interpretation of Leopold).  Consider, 
for example, an ecosystem in which deer were plentiful and predators absent.  
From a biocentric point of view, this might (albeit temporarily) be a positive state 
of affairs, given the number of flourishing deer; however, such an ecosystem 
would lack integrity (the predators are missing) as well as stability (eventually, the 
growing deer population would overgraze the area and starve to death).  Thus, 
from an ecocentric point of view, this would not be a desirable state of affairs, i.e., 
it would be a state of affairs that we ought to avoid bringing about. 
Much discussion has gone into trying to understand what Leopold means by 
“integrity,” “stability,” and “beauty.”  However, Leopold gives us at least a rea-
sonable idea of what he means by the first two of these.   In discussing integrity, 
Leopold describes wildflowers and songbirds of Wisconsin, many of which cannot 
be put to economic use but which are nonetheless “entitled to continuance” as 
members of the biotic community (Leopold 1949 p.210).  From this we can infer 
that a loss of continuance (i.e., an extinction) is a loss of integrity.  With respect to 
stability, Leopold notes that: 
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When a change occurs in one part of the circuit, many other parts must adjust themselves 
to it […] Evolutionary changes, however, are usually slow and local.  Man’s invention of 
tools has enabled him to make changes of unprecedented violence, rapidity, and scope 
(Leopold 1949 p.217). 
From this we can infer that by “stability” Leopold did not mean “unchanging”; ra-
ther, in saying that we ought to act so as to preserve stability, he was suggesting 
that we ought to reduce the scale and the speed of the changes that we make to be 
more similar to ones induced by non-human forces.  That is, we should only make 
changes that the rest of the biotic community can adjust to.  Surely, the creation of 
the Dust Bowl10 is an example of an instance in where we did not do so. 
Again, I think the implications of ecocentrism – of including ecosystems in the 
moral community – for environmental ethics are relatively straightforward.  In 
preserving integrity and stability, we need to act to protect11 endangered species.  
Furthermore, we need to put special emphasis on preserving the interactions be-
tween species, such as predator-prey or pollinator-pollinated.  It might turn out 
that certain species are more central for such relationships; thus, Leopold might 
urge us to especially protect such “keystone species.”  Finally, biodiversity is of-
ten taken to be a factor that contributes to stability, so an ecocentrist would gener-
ally seek to preserve biodiversity. 
One criticism that has been made against Leopold is that ecology no longer re-
lies on stability models; in response, alternative ecocentrisms have been developed 
that do not rely on preserving stability (e.g., Hettinger and Throop 1999).12Anoth-
er criticism is that Leopold’s ecocentrism amounts to “environmental fascism” be-
cause humans are mere members of the biotic team, with the same moral standing 
as any other member (Regan 1983).  Regan suggests that ecocentrism has the im-
plication that if “the situation we faced was either to kill a rare wildflower or a 
(plentiful) human being, and if the wildflower, as a ‘team member,’ would con-
tribute more to the ‘integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community’ than 
the human, then presumably we would not be doing wrong if we killed the human 
                                                            
10 The Dust Bowl was a phenomenon that occurred in the 1930s in the south-central plains of the 
United States.  After decades of poor farming practices that destroyed the grasses protecting the 
soil, an extended drought hit the region, leading to massive dust storms and consequent loss of 
topsoil.  Not much grew in the area for about a decade. 
11 Here one might worry about what ecocentrism is committed to with respect to “natural” (as 
opposed to human-caused) extinctions.  By my reading, the cause of the extinction is not rele-
vant, but rather, whether the extinction threatens the ecosystem of which the organism is a part.  
And here, I think that Leopold’s message is that we should generally err on the side of caution 
and assume that the organism in question is important to the ecosystem, given our ignorance.  
Also, given widespread human-caused global changes such as global warming, it would be hard 
to say that humans did not have a hand in any given extinction. 
12 Although I think the death of stability models in ecology can be exaggerated, it is certainly 
worth thinking about how we ought to behave towards ecosystems that are not naturally stable.  I 
leave the empirical question of what percentage of ecosystems are best characterized in terms of 
stability models and what percentage are best characterized in terms of instability models to 
ecologists.  
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and saved the wildflower” (Regan 1983 p.362).  In other words, ecocentrism 
seems to allow individuals – sentient individuals – to be sacrificed for the good of 
the whole. 
 
2.5 Reflections on the composition of the moral community 
 
I have presented what I take to be the major ethical positions in environmental eth-
ics; they vary in the entities included in the moral community (humans only, some 
animals, all life, ecosystems).  It should be acknowledged that my presentation is 
neither complete in its depth nor its breadth (i.e., there are variations on each of 
these positions and there are more positions).  In each case, I briefly presented the 
reasons supporting the position, while pointing out major criticisms.  I should also 
acknowledge that responses to those criticisms can also be found in the literature.  
The question remains, then – where do we go from here?  In particular, what do 
we teach our biology students, many of whom may not be interested in becoming 
environmental ethicists but who will be facing difficult environmental questions as 
biologists or as citizens? 
We could simply choose one and defend it against the criticisms.  Alternative-
ly, we could present them all and let the students decide.  However, I would like to 
present a third alternative, one that is inspired by a defense of holism/ecocentrism. 
Don Marietta (1999) suggests that no real ecocentrist is as extreme as Regan im-
plies; note, for example, that Leopold says that his land ethic “implies respect for 
his fellow-members” as well as “respect for the community as such” (quoted 
above; emphasis added).  If we were meant to respect the fellow members of our 
biotic community, then it would not seem as though killing off a human to save a 
wildflower would be justified.  Perhaps instead we would seek out ways for both 
to co-exist.  Marietta also points out that any ethical theory which reduces the val-
ue of a person to only one aspect of their life – their function in the ecosystem, or 
that they are alive, or their self-awareness, or their rationality, or their ability to 
feel pain – is leaving out characteristics that are morally significant.  To choose 
one of these over the other, Marietta suggests, would be to have an incomplete 
moral account, one that simply dismisses the important moral insights gained over 
generations of human relationships13.  Thus, Marietta argues, we have many kinds 
                                                            
13 Indeed, what does ecocentrism tell us about the ethics of lying?  What does Kantian ethics tell 
us about the ethics of siting a power plant in the habitat of an endangered species versus a non-
endangered one?  What does utilitarian ethics tell us about an invasive plant species that is re-
placing the native ones (if, for example, it turned out that the effects on sentient creatures were 
negligible)?  It seems as though there are questions on which each ethical theory will simply be 
silent and thus fail to provide any insight or guide for our behavior. 
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of duties: to each other, to the community, to future generations, to non-human an-
imals, to all living beings, and yes, to the environment as a whole. 
One way of adopting Marietta’s position, then, is to see that each of the ethical 
positions described above has merit.  Each picks out important, ethically relevant 
characteristics, and thus, none should be discarded in favor of one of the others.  
On this view, all living creatures as well as ecosystems considering holistically 
ought to be considered part of the moral community, which is not to say that our 
human rationality won’t at times (but not all the time) be what is most morally 
significant.  Of course, as Marietta acknowledges, “[t]rying to take into account 
everything that is morally relevant forces us to face complexity, conflicts, and 
confusions, but there is no justifiable alternative to hard study and the making of 
hard choices” (Marietta 1999 p.244).In other words, we can make it easier on our-
selves by choosing only one morally relevant characteristic, but we cannot defen-
sibly do so.   
In the next section, I illustrate how the different ethical theories (and the moral-
ly relevant characteristics that they invoke) can be used as a lens to illuminate dif-
ferent aspects of an environmental issue, pointing out the sorts of conflicts that can 
arise and making general suggestions for how one might solve them. 
3 Applications to Environmental Issues 
As discussed at the outset of this paper, our society faces innumerable environ-
mental challenges that raise a wide range of ethical issues.  Thus, my remarks here 
will of necessity be illustrative rather than comprehensive. 
I like to think of the different ethical theories as “lenses” that help to highlight 
different aspects of a case.  Utilizing a range of theories to understand particular 
environmental issues generates a series of considerations that can help bring rele-
vant aspects of a case to the fore. A Kantian lens forces one to consider whether 
any humans or non-humans are merely being used as instruments to bring about 
some other purpose.  This would be the case if, for example, one was considering 
siting a power plant in neighborhood where the locals were not consulted or given 
incomplete information, or were not adequately compensated for their harms.  A 
utilitarian lens forces one to exhaustively consider all sentient beings (human and 
non-human) who will be affected by an action, to try to estimate to what extent 
they are affected and whether those effects are positive or negative, and the likeli-
hood of those consequences actually occurring.  A biocentrist lens reminds us to 
take into account organisms other than the sentient ones that tend to draw our at-
tention first.  Finally, an ecocentrist lens lets one literally see the forest instead of 
just the trees, focusing on identifying and preserving the interdependencies be-
tween the species and thinking in terms of factors that would promote the longer 
term stability of the ecosystem. 
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Of course, for any given case some considerations may turn out to be more rel-
evant than others.  The point is simply that by analyzing through the lens of each 
ethical theory, one may turn up aspects of a case that might otherwise have not 
been obvious. 
In making this kind of analysis, it is important to realize that there are ways in 
which the different ethical theories will tend to conflict.  Consider again the case 
of siting a power plant.  Suppose a site has been identified.  Suppose the quickest, 
cheapest way to get the plant built is by informing and involving the local citizen-
ry in the most cursory way possible.  Suppose that the plant will have negative 
health effects on the local citizens, but that the plant will provide cheap energy to 
thousands of customers, most of whom live far enough away to avoid the negative 
health consequences.  In such case, a utilitarian might argue that the benefits of 
building such a plant outweigh the harms.  However, a Kantian ethicist would 
suggest that the local citizenry is being used as a means to obtain profit for corpo-
rations and cheap energy for customers.  They would insist that the locals be 
properly informed of the health risks and that they have a say in whether the plant 
gets built, or at least that an acceptable means of compensation is worked out. 
(Here I consider only the anthropocentric forms of these theories; including other 
sentient animals might change the analysis).   
Another classic sort of conflict is between an animal-centered perspective and 
an ecocentric one (Sagoff 1999).Consider, for example, the wild Hawaiian pig, a 
hybrid of Asian and European pigs that were brought to the Hawaiian Islands14. 
The Hawaiian Islands are known for their extraordinary biodiversity, with species 
that are found nowhere else, but the native plant species evolved in the absence of 
hooved animals and the pigs are very destructive to them.  The feral pigs are also 
harmful to native birds by creating wallows that avian malaria-carrying mosquitos 
reproduce in and by eating nestlings of birds that nest on the ground.  Finally, their 
digging leads to erosion and siltation of streams and reefs.  In other words, the 
pigs are wreaking havoc on Hawaiian ecosystems and causing the extinction of 
species; an ecocentrist would thus tend to seek the removal of the pigs.  The Na-
ture Conservancy sought to control the pig population using snares, but People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals (better known as PETA) objected that the snares 
were cruel, with pigs often dying of starvation rather than asphyxiation.  Some 
Hawaiians do not like the snares, either; hunting dogs can also get caught in them, 
and some Hawaiians like to hunt the feral pigs (thus, the goal has been to control 
rather than eradicate).  From an animal-centered point of view, then, the pigs are 
suffering great harms only for doing that which pigs do naturally.  So, while the 
snares may be justifiable from an ecocentrist point of view, they are not from an 
animal-centered one.  (Note that an animal-centered utilitarian and an animal-
centered Kantian would agree on this point; the pigs are both suffering and being 
                                                            
14 My discussion of this case relies heavily on “Case 25” of Patrick Derr and Edward McNama-
ra’s 2003 Case Studies in Environmental Ethics, a book I recommend highly as a source of di-
verse case studies to prompt discussion and thought. 
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used as a means to preserve ecosystems, with their basic rights to life being taken 
away). 
If we are not to choose one ethical theory over another in advance (as Marietta 
urges, the particular details of each case matter), how should we handle such con-
flicts?  The immediate answer is fairly obvious – try to satisfy each theory and 
each set of competing values to the greatest extent possible – and yet much ground 
can be gained by following it.   
In the power plant case, a thorough utilitarian analysis would seek out the best 
balance of happiness over unhappiness, not just a situation where happiness out-
weighed unhappiness.  Thus, the utilitarian should consider: are there other sites 
where fewer people would be harmed?  What sorts of compensation can be of-
fered to locals – money?  Jobs?  Health care?  Relocation?  Will fully informing 
them of the potential risks and allowing them to participate in solutions raise their 
level of happiness and thus overall happiness for all affected?  There are, of 
course, costs to each of these courses of action, but they might still be able to pro-
duce a reasonable utilitarian balance while going some way toward allaying Kant-
ian concerns.   
The Hawaiian feral pig situation is even more challenging, especially if we are 
seeking not to eradicate the pig from the Islands entirely and not to harm any other 
species in the process.  Still, however, it seems worth exploring other ways to con-
trol the damage that pigs cause to the ecosystem in ways that cause less suffering: 
other sorts of traps, or a pig-specific virus, perhaps?  An alternative possibility is 
to set aside pig-free areas and areas where pigs are allowed.  I don’t claim to have 
the answers to this challenging problem; I suggest only that we try to move be-
yond the pigs vs. ecosystems framing of it.  It is interesting to compare the Hawai-
ian situation to the reintroduction of wolves to Yellowstone National Park, an act 
that was meant to help restore balance to the ecosystem (and it has), but of course, 
was at the expense of deer and other wolf-prey.  My point here is not that we 
should introduce a pig predator into Hawaii (that might cause other problems!) but 
to note that it is the extreme suffering of the pigs that is creating the ecocen-
tric/animal-centric conflict.  In situations where the suffering of the animals is less 
(or at least, normal for the species), the conflict is less,15 and that provides a guide 
to our actions. 
Another conflict between ethical theories is illustrated by U.S. President Bill 
Clinton’s establishment of the Grand Staircase-Escalante (GSE) National Monu-
ment in southern Utah in 199616. President Clinton’s action pre-empted plans to 
open up a large-scale coal mining operation in the area, thus angering local resi-
dents who had been looking forward to jobs in the coal industry.  The GSE was 
established because of the diversity of habitats (from desert to coniferous forest) 
                                                            
15 However, an animal-centric Kantian ethic implies that killing the pigs in order to preserve the 
ecosystem would never be justified; non-lethal means of controlling the pigs would have to be 
found. 
16 My discussion of this case relies on “Case 16” in Derr and McNamara (2003). 
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and the diversity of species within those habitats.  There are also significant ar-
chaeological and paleontological sites in the area.  However, after the designation 
of the GSE, many noted that the previously infrequent human visits to the area 
that had preserved the different ecosystems and species had now become frequent 
ones, putting those very ecosystems and species at risk.  So, did President Clinton 
do the right thing? 
The worry about frequent visitation is easily dealt with; many parks have 
passed policies to limit human impact, by limiting the number of visitors and their 
activities or limiting the types and numbers of vehicles that can be used in the 
park, etc.  However, a conflict still remains; from an anthropocentric point of 
view, there is the loss of future jobs and the loss of local autonomy (and so the de-
cision seems to have been wrong one), whereas from an ecocentric – and perhaps 
biocentric and animal-centric – point of view there is the preservation of ecosys-
tems and species (and so the decision seems to have been the right one).  So, can 
this conflict be resolved, and if so, how? 
Were we able to go back in time and re-do this decision, we could certainly 
make an effort to involve the local residents in the decision (although some would 
argue that these sorts of areas are for all people to enjoy, not just the local resi-
dents).  More than that, though, we could again seek to maximize different values.  
Here, more detail is of the essence17. On the human side of the equation: How bad-
ly do the local people need jobs?  What sorts of jobs are created by tourism, and 
how do they compare monetarily?  How do they compare in terms of length of 
employment or in quality of life for the employee?  Can energy needs be met in 
ways other than coal, ways that might also be job-producing (and perhaps safer)?  
How much enjoyment will having the area set aside as a park bring to its visitors? 
On the ecosystem side of the equation: How much diversity is in this area; how 
does it compare to other areas?  Are there unique species?  Endangered species?  
Unique habitats?  Endangered habitats?  To what extent would these be threatened 
by the coal mining?   
The answers to these questions matter.  If it turns out that the tourism jobs are 
sufficiently comparable to the mining jobs and that this is a “biodiversity hotspot,” 
then it seems as though President Clinton made the right decision.  However, if the 
mining jobs are far superior, if locals desperately needed them, and if the area was 
not all that biodiverse after all, then it seems as though President Clinton made the 
wrong decision.  However, my point is not to try to settle this case; rather, it is to 
say that, as hard as it is to balance competing values, asking and answering more 
detailed questions about the effects on all the organisms and ecosystems involved 
can go a long way toward making the best solution easier to see.  (Getting people 
to agree to it and getting it implemented are even more challenging – but those ac-
tions lead us outside the scope of ethics). 
                                                            
17 Again, as Marietta emphasizes, such decisions should not be made in the abstract. 
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4 Conceptual Issues 
Much of the discussion above relies on contended biological concepts: species, 
ecosystems, biodiversity, life, etc. (see also Justus this volume).  Other conceptual 
questions may arise as well; for example, the question, “What is sustainability?” 
In discussing environmental ethics with their students, biology educators should 
be aware of these controversies and how they affect our ethical analyses.  Once 
again, these are large issues, and I will only scratch the surface. 
Consider the concept “ecosystem.”  What is an ecosystem?  Can one ecosystem 
be cleanly delineated from another? Or is it only that some ecosystems are able to 
be delineating clearly (e.g., on an island or in a pond) and others are “clear 
enough” (i.e., with real but fuzzy boundaries)?  Or is there no privileged way of 
delineating ecosystems?  It is evident that the answers to these questions affect 
how we understand ecocentrism – in other words, they affect what we take our-
selves to be trying to preserve – and yet there has been much disagreement about 
the proper answers (Odenbaugh 2007).  One sort of problematic case is illustrated 
by the Mauhoun river basin in Burkina Faso.18This area is inhabited by two spe-
cies of tsetse flies, Glossina tachinoides Westwood and Glossina palpalis gambi-
ensisVanderplank.  The region appears to be patchy, habitat-wise, with some areas 
preserved as reserves while other areas have undergone agricultural development.  
However, when we look at the behavior of the two species of flies, we find that 
one forms a panmictic breeding population whereas the other only breeds within 
the reserves.  So, is it one ecosystem or several?  Or, is the concept of ecosystem 
species-relative19? 
Or consider the concept of “species” (see Wilkins this volume).  The most 
common one among biologists (or at least those biologists who study animals20) is 
the biological species concept.  As articulated by Ernst Mayr, this is the view that 
“Species are groups of interbreeding natural populations that are reproductively 
isolated from other such groups” (Mayr 1996 p.264). However, by one count, 
there are 26 concepts of species in the literature (Wilkins 2008); the question 
“what is the concept of ‘species’?” (or even “are there multiple legitimate con-
cepts of ‘species’?”) is hotly contended.  So, when we say that we want to pre-
serve species, what is it that we are trying to preserve?  Consider, for example, the 
California Tiger Salamander (CTS) and the Barred Tiger Salamander (BTS).21The 
CTS and the BTS had been allopatric for ~5 million years, with the CTS in Cali-
fornia and the BTS in Texas, but because of their value as bait, in the 1940s and 
1950s bait dealers from the Salinas Valley imported thousands of BTS larvae into 
                                                            
18 My discussion of this case relies on Peck (2009). 
19 As Peck (2009) argues. 
20 Biologists who study microbial life, for example, do not tend to endorse the biological species 
concept (see Bourrat et al. this volume); for one, some microbes do not reproduce sexually and 
so the biological species concept seems inapplicable to them. 
21 My discussion here relies on that of Fitzpatrick and Shaffer (2004, 2007). 
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California.  Since then, the BTS and the CTS have been producing viable hybrids.  
The BTS and the CTS have distinctive phenotypes and genetic characters.  Are 
they two species or one?  The CTS have been listed as “endangered” under the 
Endangered Species Act, but are they really a distinct species?  What about the 
hybrids?  Again, how we answer these conceptual questions affects how we un-
derstand the ethical issues. 
Biodiversity is another thorny conceptual issue; it is often spelled out in terms 
of number of species.  Even if we can settle the question of what species are, how-
ever, it’s not at all clear that sheer number of species is really the issue.  Some 
species are quite different from one another, whereas others are quite similar.  Is it 
that we want to preserve great numbers of species, regardless of how similar they 
are?  Or do we want to preserve the greatest number of different species?  (And 
how should that be characterized?)  Or, should we consider preserving diverse 
subspecies?  Diverse genomes?  Diverse habitats?  In other words, is species even 
the right level of the biological hierarchy at which to preserve diversity? (For dis-
cussion of the concept of biodiversity, see, e.g., Norton 1994; Callicott, Crowder, 
and Mumford 1999; Gaston 2004). 
The reader may have noticed that a subtle shift occurred in the last paragraph 
from the conceptual to the normative.  That is, we can seek to ask the question, 
“what is biodiversity?” but that question very quickly becomes “what should we 
preserve?”  Thus, the normative and the conceptual questions are intertwined.  
Note that this is to some extent true of the species and ecosystem concepts as well; 
although those conceptual debates sometimes occur outside of the normative 
realm, once they are in the normative realm it is hard to keep the normative issues 
separated from the conceptual ones.  In other words, if we are asking “what is the 
concept ‘species’?” with an eye to preserving endangered species, it seems as 
though we are partly asking what it is we would like to preserve: Distinctive ge-
netic and phenotypic characteristics?  Distinctive past evolutionary histories?  Dis-
tinctive future evolutionary histories?  Or something else?  Similar considerations 
apply to ecosystems; are we preserving inter-species relationships, particular com-
binations of species, particular “ecosystem services,” or something else? 
Some concepts are even more value-infused – sustainability, for example.  Sus-
tainability is the buzzword of the day, and yet it is highly ambiguous.   Are we try-
ing to sustain only human activities, or are non-human activities included (Cal-
licott and Mumford 1997)?  Are we trying to sustain “business as usual,” or might 
sustainability involve sacrifice?  If agricultural sustainability is the issue, are we 
trying to sustain certain types of processes or a certain agricultural yield, and then, 
statically or dynamically  (Blatz 1992)? Should sustainability be linked to carrying 
capacity or ecological footprint  (Vanderheiden 2008)? Should we be aiming for 
land health rather than sustainability (Newton and Freyfogle 2005)? 
Being aware of the controversies over concepts like these and how these con-
troversies affect ethical discussions can help biology educators get students to 
think critically about important environmental issues of our time.  
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5 Conclusion 
I have argued that biology students can benefit from 1) understanding different 
ethical theories concerning the environment as well as the reasons offered in sup-
port of and against them, in order to better understand their own views as well as 
the views of others; 2) seeing how different ethical theories can used as lenses to 
help understand different aspects of concrete cases and to work towards solutions 
that maximize different values; and 3) recognizing that key concepts are often 
themselves controversial as well as value laden, encouraging them to explore envi-
ronmental issues in all of their complexity.  I thus encourage biology educators to 
incorporate these issues in their classes. 
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